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Trends in Output
So far studies have been completed of the outputs of osix
broad industrial groups containing scores of individual in-
dustries that produce a multitude of products. To obtain a
broad view of the findings, we begin by analyzing the place
of the six industry groups in the economy and proceed to
estimate their aggregate output. The effects on aggregate out-
put of changes in quality of product and the transfer of activ-
ities from the household to the market, and the problems of
the measurement of output in the chief unexplored section
of the economy—the service industries—are then discussed.
Finally, we turn to changes in the composition of the output
of the six industry groups and investigate their implications
for several interesting questions concerning the theory and
facts of economic development.
Total Output
The net output of the economy consists of the production
of commodities and services for current consumption plus
the addition made to stocks of goods and resources that per-
mits 'larger consumption in the future. This flow of output is
the national income; so for a broad view of the change over
°timein the economy's net output we look at the movements
of national income.
There are, however, two tall obstacles to the use of national
income figures to measure net output in 'real' terms. The
first is that national income is a series of aggregate money
flows, whereas our interest is in the outputs of goods and
services somehow divorced, or at least amicably separated,
from fluctuations in the value of the dollar. This obstacle is
surmounted by deflating national income in current dollars
by one or a series of price indexes. These price indexes, how-
ever, are extremely difficult to construct on a basis appropri-
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ate to the aim of measuring real national income. The neces-
sary information on retail prices is scanty even for the fairly
recent past. And even if we had the data, we wduld still have
to surmount the difficulty that confronts all attempts to
measure 'real' changes, the so-called index-number problem:
we wish to achieve the inconsistent objectives of giving due
weight to the relative importance of various commodities at
any one time and yet, although this relative importance often
changes rapidly, of maintaining comparability through time.
The second difficulty, for our purposes, in the use of na-
tional income figures is that prior to 1919 they are primarily
series on physical output measured in current or constant
prices. With the important exception of services (which are
deflated by the prices of commodities), all components of
Kuznets' series on national product (which goes back to
1869) rest largely upon the same underlying data as the out-
put studies. Differences between the National Bureau series
on physical output and the corresponding segments olE real
national income are therefore due in considerable part to dif-
ferences in the way current prices are deflated. For this reason,
and because of the considerable uncertainty surrounding
estimates of national income in the earlier years,' we do not
discuss the trend of national income since 1900. Kuznets' find-
ings on the long-term movements of national product are
summarized in the first volume Of this series: National In-
come: A Summary of Findings.
We may use the national income data since 1919, when
they are independent in source and detailed in composition,
to get a general idea of the comprehensiveness of the pro-
ductivity studies already published. About 40 percent of na-
tional income in the two interwar decades has been covered
iThe uncertainty is illustrated, but not measured, by the fact that R. F.
estimates for average national product in 1889-98 arc about 12 per.
cent larger than Kuznets', although the underlying methods and data are by
no means independent. See Kuznets, National Product since 1869 (National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1946), p. 86; Martin, National Income in the
United States, 1799-1938 (National Industrial Conference Board, 1939).8 TRENDS IN OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT
in the productivity studies (see Table i). The coverage is
much greater for commodity- than for service-producing in-
dustries: indexes of output have been compiled for 90 per-
cent of the industries (measured by their contribution to na-
tional income) producing physical commodities, but for only
1 1 percent of the industries that provide services.
TABLE 1
Scope of National Bureau Studies of Productivity, Measured by
the Average Percentage of National Income Originating in Six
Industries, 1919-1938
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souRcE: Simon Kuznets, Nationa' Income and Its Composition(National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1941) ,I,i66.
Inadequacies of data on weights render it impossible to
construct an entirely satisfactory index of aggregate output
of the six industries listed in Table i. However, a rough ap-
proximation to such an index is obtained by using estimates
of 'value-added' (sales minus purchases of current supplies
from other industries) in the six industries (Table 2). Phys-
ical output nearly tripled between 1899 and 1939; almost the
entire increase occurred in the first three decades. As popula-TRENDS IN OUTPUT 9
tion increased 75 percent meanwhile, output per capita of
population rose two-thirds.
TABLE 2
Indexes of Output of Six Industries and of Population, 1899-1939
(1899: ioo)
PHYSICAL OUTPUT
OUTPUT POPULATION PER CAPITA
1899 100 100 100
1909 146 121 120
1919 195 140 139
1929 283 163 174
1939 289 175 165
The indexes of output were computed by the Edgeworth formula, using
estimates of as weights (see Fabricant, Output of Manufactur-
ing, p. 370), with each date the comparison base for the succeeding date.
The estimates of value-added were:
MANUFACTURING: Value-added, as reported by the Census.
AGRICULTURE: Cash income plus value of food consumed on farms minus
current expenses. (Net Farm Income and Parity Report, 1943; Bureau of
Agricultural Economics, July1944.)The value-added ratio for 1910was
applied to 1909 and 1899 gross income, extrapolated by data in Strauss and
Bean, Gross Farm Income and Indexes of Farm Production (Department
of Agriculture, Technical Bulletin 703).
MINING: Receipts minus materials, fuel, and power, as reported by the
Census; the ratio of value added was interpolated for 1929, when petroleum
was excluded from the Census.
STEAM RAILROADS: Operating revenues minus materials and supplies; average
of fiscal years before 1919.
ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER: Revenue minus fuel, data from Gould, cit.,
Appendix B. The values for the years in the table were interpolated by
output. This industry entered the index in 1909.
MANUFACTUREI)GAS: Revenueminus fuel, data from Gould, op. cit., Appen-
dix B.
NATURAL GAS: Revenue, data from ibid., p. i6o.
The output index of Table 2 can be divided into indexes
for commodity- and service-producing industries.
INDUSTRIES 1899 1909 1919 1929 1939
Commodity-producing ioo 140 i8o 267 277
Service-producing ioo i86 312 400 374
The service industries are too poorly represented to admit of
any generalization, but the commodity industries are so fully
represented that the index would not be changed much if
construction and minor industries now excluded were in-
cluded. The output of the commodity industries—agriculture,10 TRENDS IN OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT
manufacturing, and mining—can be described in virtually the
same terms as the aggregate index for the six industries, in
which they of course dominate.
The over-all index in Table 2 displays extremely sharp re-
tardation in the 'thirties: the output of the six industries,
which had grown at an average rate of 3.5 percent per year
between 1899 and 1929, now rose only 2.1 percent in a dec-
ade. In this the index faithfully mirrors its components, for
the indexes of the industry groups (manufacturing, agricul-
ture, and mining), we shall presently see, show little retarda-
tion between 1899 and 1929 but sharp retardation thereafter.2
Two very different explanations have frequently been ad-
vanced for the failure of output to grow during the 'thirties.
In the one view it is characteristic, indeed inevitable in a
maturing private enterprise economy; in the other view it is
a sort of economic fault, due to a special combination of polit-
ical and economic circumstances which may be supplanted by
more fundamental and persistent forces that dominated pre-
vious history, and which in any case were absent before the
Great Depression. A useful discussion of.this conflict would
take us far beyond the scope of the studies under review, and
we must be content to note one fact that bears on the con-
temporary discussion of the maturity thesis: there is no evi-
dence, of long-term retardation before 1929.
Improvements in Quality of Product
We have been discussing indexes of physical output. But out-
put of what? Of the automobiles of 1900, which were some-
times thoughtfully equipped with attachments for harness?
Of the gasoline of 1914, which Colorado sought to improve
by enacting a statute that set a maximumof5percentonsolid
matter? Clearly we wish an index of output that measures
2A longer survey might reveal a gradual downward drift in the rate of in-
crease of output since 1870, but the retardation—if it was present at all—was
small; see A. F. Burns, Production Trends in the United States since 1870
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1934), pp. 270 if.TRENDS IN OUTPUT 11
quality as well as quantity, but precisely what do we mean by
quality, and how can it be measured?
In everyday discourse we usually understand quality to
mean technical characteristics or operating properties. Thus
we say the automobile tire of 1937 had eight times the mileage
of the tire of 192 i, or we say the incandescent lamp produced
3.4 lumens per watt (units of light produced per unit of
power consumed) in 1906 and 14.7 in 1937. Occassionally we
may tend also to view style changes as improvements but here
we tread on dangerous ground: our tastes have altered enough
to make the clothes of igoo amusing to see and embarrassing
to wear —asamusing and embarrassing as today's clothes
would have appeared to the eyes of 1900.
Some estimate of the magnitude of changes in quality can
often be made from changes in the technological properties of
a commodity. For example, the tractive power of a steam loco-
motive is often used as a measure of its quality. In 1904 the
average tractive power of a new locomotive was about 27,000
pounds, and in 1939 about 107,000 pounds.3 Fabricant's in-
dex of output for steam locomotives declined from 366 in
1904 to 29 in 1939—a 92 percent drop. If the production data
are corrected for changes in quality, the percentage fall is re-
duced to 6g percent.
Such technological measures of quality are subject to def-
inite limitations, however. A single measure of quality is
usually inappropriate: thus if locomotive quality is meas-
ured only by tractive power, other improvements such as fuel
economy (the pounds of fuel required to haul i,ooo gross
3The 1904 figure is calculated as follows: the distribution by type of loco-
motives is estimated from the differences between the number of locomotives
of each type reported in 1903 and 1904 in Statistics of Railways in the United
States, which also gives their tractive power; the tractive power of locomotives
installed in 1939 (for which the number of each type is given in Statistics
of Railways, 1939)is estimated from information in R. P. Johnson, The
Steam Locomotive (Simmons-Boardman, 1942). The estimate for 1904 is prob-
ably low because it is based on average tractive power, not on that of new
locomotives.12 TRENDS IN OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT
freight ton-miles fell from 172 in 1920 tO 1 12 ifl 1940) are
ignored; yet we cannot add fuel economy and tractive power.
Even if a single technical characteristic were a suitable meas-
ure of quality, it would often fail us when new types of prod-
uct appeared: for example, tractive power is not an appro-
priate measure of the performance of Diesel and electric lo-
comotives.
There is a second method of measuring changes in quality:
to find the ratio of prices of new and old qualities of a prod-
uct during a period when both are available. This is a direct
application of the existing method of combining different
goods in an index, except .that different qualities are treated
—as they should be—as different goods. The method may be
illustrated by changes in the quality of gasoline. In 1940 the
octane number of 'regular' gasoline rose from 70-72 to 72-74
(as a continuation of the rise from below 65 in 1931, when
this system of gasoline rating was adopted by manufacturers).
The improved grade sold for 12.9 percent more than the
lower grade during the period when both were sold. In meas-
uring the output of gasoline, ioo gallons of the superior grade
may be treated as equal to i 13 gallons of the inferior grade.
This second method of measuring quality is automatically
followed in the construction of the National Bureau indexes
of output when the underlying data on outputs are classified
finely enough. For instance, by using values as weights, Fabri-
cant counts i .6o open passenger automobiles as the equivalent
of one closed automobile in 1919. But the Census classifica-
tions are too broad for any large proportion of quality
changes to be measured by this method: thus igig and '939
open passenger automobiles are treated as identical.4
How widespread and important have these unmeasured
quality improvements been? Fabricant's volume abounds
4The broadness of the Census classifications is emphasized by the fact that
one cannot find in the highly detailed appendices of Fabricant's Output of
Manufacturing Industries unequivocal evidence of the appearance of a single
new manufacturing product between 1899 and 1937.TRENDS IN OUTPUT 13
with descriptions of large technical improvements, and the
absence of examples of quality deterioration is also eloquent.
Barger lays less emphasis upon quality changes in agriculture
and mining, but if systematic account were taken of the
inmilk production,
improvements in the qualities of cotton, fruits, meat, etc.,
and the greater standardization and uniformity of mining
products, the improvement of quality in these industries
might also be found to be substantial. No enumeration of
instances of quality improvement, however, will carry with
our statistically-minded age the weight of a specific, over-all
number, and quality improvements will continue to be un-
disputed but easily forgotten until they have been subjected
to general measurement.
Household vs. Market
If our indexes of the economy's output have a downward
bias because quality improvements are not measured com-
pletely, they have an upward bias because they cover a larger
proportion of output as production within the household
declines. The transfer of activities from household to market
has often been mentioned, but it is doubtful that its extent
is generally appreciated. A few comparative indexes of this
trend suggest large shifts toward prepared foods and greater
reliance upon laundries and apartment and hotel housing
services (Table 3).Thereis little doubt (if also little evi-
dence) that restaurant sales have risen substantially relative
to total sales of food, and production of clothing in the
household has declined.5 The urban family is also buying
in smaller units, and is transferring the storage and parceling
of food to retailers.
Nor should only direct transfers of this sort be taken in
5Occupational statistics suggest that employees of eating places tripled or
quadrupled between igoo and population increased only 75 percent.
The output of ready-to-wear apparel more than tripled, but factors such as
the shift to more fashionable and less durable dress complicate the inter-
pretation.14 TRENDS IN OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT
TABLE 3
Some Measures of the Transfer of Activities
from the Household to the Market
Transfers to Manufacturing 1899 1939
% of domestically consumed wheat flour used by
commercial bakeries 14.8 43.4
Cases of canned vegetables produced per ioo persons 27.5 139.1
Cases of canned fruits produced per too persons 4.8 57.3
Transfersto Service Industries 1900 1910
% of families taking boarders and lodgers 23 5
Employees in commercial laundries and cleaning
establishments per i,ooo persons 1.4
% of families in large cities in multiple-unit dwellings 39.2 57.7
souRcE: Employees in commercial laundries and cleaning establishments,
estimated from Census data; all other data from Stigler, op. cit., pp. 26 if.
account. The washing machine and the vacuum cleaner, for
example, have in effect reduced househpld work and ex-
panded manufacturing activity.6 Mechanical fuel systems
provide another important example: in 1940, 21.3 percent
of the nation's dwelling units were heated by gas or petro-
leum products, and 64.5 percent used these sources and elec-
tricity as cooking fuels.
The greater reliance on the market has been due in part
to technological advances such as the invention and improve-
ment of the washing machine. The move to the cities has
increased the availability of market provision of processed
foods, laundering services, and the like. The average family
declined from 4.6 to 3.7 persons in the last 40years,con-
tributing to a relative growth of multiple-unit dwellings.
The increase in the percentage of married women who were
in the labor force from 5.6 in 1900 to i6.8 in 1940 was both
a cause and an effect of the shift of production to the market.
Relative prices have, at least for some commodities, become
more favorable to processed goods,7 and the rise in real in-
OThe automobile reduced the effort of getting to work—where should one
draw the line?
7The following data on changes in the relative consumption and prices of
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come made it possible for more families to buy goods and
services (such as prepared baby foods and diaper services)
that are time-consuming or unpleasant to perform.
The effects of these transfers upon commercial employ-
ment cannot be estimated precisely, but a very rough esti-
mate is that a twentieth of the wage-earners in manufacturing
alone were in 1940 providing commodities or services that in
1900 were produced within the household, and of course the
shifts to the service industries have been even larger. In many
cases the commercial service was no doubt higher in quality,
but this transfer is yet another reason why indexes of output
should not be confused with indexes of welfare. There may be
substantial shifts of activities between household and market
within a business cycle, as well as very large shifts during ma-
jor wars; so even short-run movements of measured output
may diverge materially from those of the output of all goods
and services.
The Output of Service Industries
observed above, for only a small segment of service indus-
tries—steam railroads and gas and electric utilities—have in-
dexes of output been calculated, whereas they are now avail.-
able for the preponderant share of commodity-producing in-
dustries. This relative neglect of services is attributable in
some degree to the absence of pertinent data, but in greater
degree to conceptual difficulties, which we now discuss.
If we wished to construct an index of the aggregate output
of retailing services, for example, we would have to know first
the individual products of the industry: the amounts of stor-
Ratio: bread to Ratio: price of
flour consumed bread to price
(pounds) of flour
1901 1935 1901 1935
New York '.39 4.60 1.76 1.58
Ohio 1.58 1.98 1.65
California i.o6 2.76 2.4.2 1.69
Louisiana 3.26 6.87 1.34 1.38
Basic data from Eighteenth Report of the Co1nniissioner of Labor (1903)
and Bureau of Labor Statistics, Retail Prices, Bulletin 635TRENDS IN OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT
age, selling, wrapping, delivery, credit extension, and similar
services supplied to consumers. The problems that would be
encountered in enumerating these quantities are not different
in nature, and perhaps not in magnitude, from those already
faced, and solved in varying degree, in the commodity-produc-
ing industries. But when one seeks the prices with which to
weight these services in constructing a single index, a new prob-
1cm arises. Rarely is there a separate and definite retail price
differential for cash payments vs. a month's credit, delivery of
specified frequency, or availability of rarely purchased items.
These services are usually supplied jointly in variable amounts.
It is as if, in manufacturing, the unit of sales were a variable
combination of refrigerators plus toasters plus dishwashers
plus washjng machines. Indeed, because the 'terms of sale'
(credit, promptness of delivery, guarantees, servicing, etc.)
are in fact variable components of the output of commodity-
producing industries, the same problem is present in measur-
ing their output. But perhaps because it is believed that these
'terms of sale' are relatively unimportant—which is not intui-
tively obvious—the recorded price is attributed entirely to the
physical product.
The types of data that must be enumerated are admittedly
a serious obstacle to calculating indexes of service outputs.8
Is the additional obstacle of the absence of an explicit price
system insurmountable? I think not. There exists an implicit
price system for the components of retailing service, to con-
tinue our example, and it could be uncovered by statistical
analysis of approprjate data. By classifying retail stores of a
type with respect to these various services, we would be
able to isolate the effect of a particular service on the retail
margin. Fragments of information on this subject are already
available. But to construct indexes of service outputs will be a
very large task.°
8lndeed in certain industries suchasdomestic service this obstacle seems
decisive.
Ms afirst approximation, we may measure(e.g.)retailing output byTRENDS IN OUTPUT 17
A different type of price problem is confronted in public
enterprise —governmentsand nonprofit institutions. The
'buyer's' common inability to determine freely the quantities
he wishes to purchase of the prodñcts and services of such
groups means that we cannot attribute proportionality of
prices to marginal significances—the fundamental basis for
combining heterogeneous economic quantities. It must suffice
here to observe that this problem has received much careful
attention from students of national income, and apparently
has not yet been solved to their satisfaction.
In still other service categories even the specific content of
output is debatable. We may cite as very different examples
soldiers and teachers. In such fields it is not now possible
even to enumerate the specific services that are sought. Per-
force we adopt the convention that output is identical with
input, or leave output unmeasured.
Composition of Output
Perhaps the first discovery of a person who begins to inves-
tigate the composition of output is the existence of a vexing
problem of classification. We expect the broadest classifica-
tions—manufactures vs. agricultural products, consumer vs.
producer goods, and the like—to be difficult to define: the
enormously diverse details of economic life offer innumer-
able challenges to classifications and invitations to arbitrary
decisions. But the difficulties persist even in narrower classi-
fications. There is no natural unit of analysis, unless it is the
individual transaction, corresponding to the man in popula-
tion studies or the isotope in chemistry: almost every 'prod-
uct' can be by quality, location and time of pro-
duction, use, etc.
Other difficulties are raised by the different interests of the
physical volume of goods sold, each type of goods being weighted by the
retail margin perunit. This procedureisanalogoustothatusedin
measuring physical output of commodity-producing industries when quality
changes are not taken into account.i8 TRENDS IN OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT
data collector and the data user. The collector must report
the complex details of economic life in few enough classes to
be comprehended, and with due regard to comparability be-
tween classes and between times. The data user, on the other
hand, commonly has much more specialized interests, and
these interests are often dictated by problems that do not
spring Into prominence until a generation or more after the
data have been reported.
The effects of the absence of a 'natural unit' in output
studies and the reporting methods of data collectors may be
illustrated with respect to stability of composition. We might
wish to compare the relative stability of the composition of
outputs of food and machinery in manufacturing (using, say,
the coefficient of correlation between values-added by indi-
vidual products within the two classes at two dates). The re-
sult, which would be that the composition of machinery
output was much more stable than that of food, would be
completely pre-determined by the classifications: almost all
machinery is grouped into three or four classes so composi-
tion cannot vary much.
Certain significant aspects of composition, however, can
be investigated with tolerable accuracy. Three are considered
here: the relative growths of consumer durable and non-
durable goods; the trends of output in the six major industry
categories; and the interrelations between changes in outputs
of broad categories and of more specific products of which
they are composed.
The Flow of Consumer Goods
It is not easy to form a general impression of the growth in
the output of consumer goods from the numerous indexes of,
outputs of specific goods in the several National Bureau
studies. To reduce the complexity of the picture, several in-
dexes were combined (see Table 4). These indexes do not,
of course, parallel exactly the corresponding consumption
series. The former take no account of exports or imports orTRENDS IN OUTPUT 19
TABLE 4
Output Indexes of Consumer Goods, 1899-1939
1899 1909 1919 1929 1939
Productivity Studies
Food 100 344 196 290 324
Beverages ioo 147 251
Tobaccoproducts ioo 230 400
Textiles 100 158 176 263 313
Shoes ioo 127 350 165 i86
Automobile, tires, and gasoline ...... 769 2,430 2,051
Sixindustries ioo 146 195 283 289
W. H. Shaw's Study
.Consumer perishables ioo 141 170 239 295
Consumersemi-durables 100 145 188 334 272
Consumerdurables 100 148 318 622 551
Allconsumer goods ioo 143 191 320
Population 100 121 140 163 175
Food consists of manufactured food plus potatoes, poultryand
eggs, dairy products(weighted only by value of fluid milk), fruits, and
noncommercial truck products. Barger's and Fabricant's indexes were com-
bined by value of product, estimated from Agricultural Statistics and the
Census of Manufactures.
Shoes are leather and rubber, combined by Census data on value.
Automobiles, tires and tubes(included after 1919),andpetroleum refin-
ing were combined by Census data on value.
There is some as when fruits are included in both agriculture
and manufactured products, some inclusion of producer goods(rugs for
offices), and some omissions(food grown offfarms). The indexes are
therefore only rough measures.
Shaw's series are from Finished Commodities since 1879, Paper 3
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1941).
ofinventory changes, and the outputs of durable goods in
any year may bear little relation to the use of such goods dur-'
ing the year. More comprehensive indexes compiled by
ham H. Shaw, which do allow for exports and imports and
make a finer allocation between producer and consumer
goods, are also given.'0
lOSee Finished Commodities since 1879, Occasional Paper 3 (National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1941).Shawestimates (from independent
the proportions of a commodity (e.g., coal)that are used by producers and
consumers, whereas we do this only roughly by the system of weights. He
eliminates price changes by the use of price indexes for 44 groups of com-
modities, whereas prices of individual commodities are used for this purpose
in the productivity studies.20 TRENDS IN OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT
The output of food rose rapidly—to three times its 1899
level. Per capita consumption of food, measured by weight
or calories, was probably more or less stable (indeed, falling
gradually) during this period when per capita food output
rose three-quarters. The rise in output reflects both the shift
to more expensive foods (vegetables, dairy products, citrus
fruits) and the further processing of food (flour into bread,
the canning of vegetables) before it leaves manufacturing.
The lesser importance of food grown and consumed on farms
also raises the index. The increase in the output of food
would be even largerwe could take account of the greater
proportion purchased in restaurants.
Of the four groups of nondurable goods in Table 4, all
except one (alcoholic beverages) rose more than the aggre-
gate output of the three commodity-producing industries
covered by the productivity studies. Shaw's index of the out-
put of nondurable consumer goods rose almost 200 percent
from 1899 to '939, and conforms fairly well with this finding
of rapid growth. But his index of the total output of all
goods rose considerably more than that of our three com-
modity-producing industries," and yields the opposite con-
clusion, namely, that consumer perishables and semi-dura-
bles rose less rapidly than total output. Each approach has its
shortcomings, so it is probably unsafe to conclude more than
that the increases in nondurables and in total output were of
the same order of magnitude. If the increases in productivity
(relative to population) of commodity-producing industries
lead to a relative decline in the share of consumer nondura-
bles, as some believe, the tendency is relatively weak. But
Shaw's indexes clearly demonstrate that consumer durables
have increased more rapidly than nondurables(or than
producer goods).
liThe two series are:
18991909 191919291939
ThreeCommodity-Producing Industries ioo 140 i8o 267 277
Shaw'sTotal Output 100 144 206 323 331TRENDSIN OUTPUT 21
Output of Six Industries
The relative contributions of the six industries to the
total 'value-added' of the group are presented in Table 5.
The most striking results, which would survive in more accu-
rate measures, are the rapid decline of agriculture after 1919,
the approximately offsetting increases in manufacturing, and
TABLE 5
Composition of Output, Measured by Percentage of
Value-Added, by Each of Six Industries, 1899-1939
1899 1909 1919 1929 1939
Agriculture 30.8 31.5 29.8 tS.8 15.9
Manufacturing 48.9 47.1 52.5 59.4 61.7
Mining 5.6 5.3 5.3 5.5 6.4
Electric light and power 1.0 1.4 4.9'
Gas .8 i.i .7
Steamrailroads 13.8 14.0 10.3 11.4 9.3
Total 100.0 ioo.o 100.0 100.0
thesimilar offset of the growth of electric light and power
by the decline of steam railroads (Chart i).12
The decade increases, summarized, in Table 6, are some-
what misleading because of the effects of business cycles:
1899 was a peak year, 1909 a year of expansion, 1919 a year
of both contraction and recovery, 1929 a peak year, and
1939 a year of expansion. Consequently, the increase from
1929 to 1939 is low relative to the underlying trend, and
that from 1919 to 1929 high. From Chart i, however, it
appears that the secular rate of increase in manufacturing
was virtually constant to 1929, and the rate of increase of
output in agriculture and mining fell only slowly. The rates
of growth in the other, less diversified, industries fell more
rapidly.
The movements of output in the six industries are ma-
terially influenced by their definitions. We need not con-
l2The annual data are given in the Appendix. The vertical scale in Chart i
(andsubsequent charts) measures only percentage changes in output; the
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TABLE 6
Percentage Changes in the Outputs of Six Industries and in
their Aggregate Output, by Decades, 1899-1939
1899-19091909-19191919-1929 1 929-1939
Agriculture ii.i 12.6 15.2 10.4
Manufacturing 57.8 40.6 63.9 2.7
Mining 84.0 27.3 66.i —5.9
Electric light and power
Gas 78.2 48.8
Steam railroads 8o.6 66.i 7.5 —25.0
Aggregate output 45.8 35.5 45.4 1.9
Index for electric light and power for 1909 estimated by linear interpolation.
cern ourselves with the propriety of the definitions at any
given time. When a reasonably clear distinction between
manufacturing and mining or between trade and services is
sought, the conventional nature of these categories soon
becomes apparent. It is more relevant to observe the effects
of even minor changes in classification. For example. in
1909, 124,000 persons in power laundries were reported in
manufacturing; in 1939, 254,000 persons in the same industry
were reported in services. Again, in 1914,17,700persons
were in automobile repair shops—in manufacturing; in 1939
thenumber was services. If the Census Bureau
had retained these industries in manufacturing, its personnel
would be about 2 percent higher in 1909, and aboutper-
cent higher in 1939.Thesevariations in practice were easy
to cope with, but have there been important shifts of activi-
ties between industries that are not so directly reported?
The distribution of productive activities among broad
industry groups usually shifts slowly, but under the impact
of changes in technology and mores the aggregate shift is
sometimes large in even relatively short periods. When we
are discussing the importance of a cultural-economic group
such as farmers, the shift of activities to the factory tequires
no special treatment—the decline of agriculture is no less real
whether due to a shift away of activities or the release of
workers on farms due to technological progress. But if we
are interested in the proportion of resources necessary to24 TRENDS IN OUTPUT ANDEMPLOYMENT
provide food at a given level of preparation, a shift of activi-
ties leads us to misjudge changes in the relative share of
resources necessary to satisfy our needs. To document •the
importance of such shifts, we examine in some detail the case
of agriculture.
The movement of food processing away from the farm
is as ancient as the growth of cities. The transfer had gone
far in cheese and the slaughter of animals by 1900, as Table 7
indicates. Other industry boundaries were also shifting: the
complementary percentages understate the relative growth
of factory output because the processing of livestock by retail-
ers also declined. The indexes of agricultural and manufac-
turing output and employment during our period would
not be affected significantly by recognizing this shift.'3
TABLE 7
Shift of Food Processing from the Farm, 1879-1939
Percentage of Production on Farmsa
1879 1899 1939
Cheese 11.2 5.5 Butter 96.4 71.8 21.3




Sheep and lambs 4.2 3.1
aE. E. Vial, Producion and Consumption of Manufactured Dairy Products,
Department of Agriculture, Technical Bulletin 722 (1940); data from
Agricultural Statistics.
bBargerand Landsberg, op. cit., p. gn.
A much more important shift is involved in the replace-
ment of horses and mules by tractors and automobiles. In
1900 there were no automobiles on farms and virtually no
tractors; in fact, both became prominent only during World
War I. In 1940 there were 4100,000 automobiles, i,ooo,-
ooo trucks, and i,6oo,ooo tractors on American farms. E. G.
l3The labor requirements for these food-processing activities on the farm
are not known. The food-processing industries required about 20.000 man-
years in 1939 to handle the increase in the of output that was
done in factories compared with the proportion in 1899.TRENDS IN OUTPUT 25
McKibben and R. A. Griffin estimated the saving in farm
labor due to this shift, on the following assumptions:'4
i) The tractor increased the output of a worker in field op-
erations 50 percent, and is used hours a year.
2) About 7 million horses and mules have been displaced,
with annual savings of:
a)50 hours of labor caring for each animal;
b)35 hours of labor caring for each of 1,750,000 young
horses required to replace themillion;
c)17.6 man-hours per acre in raising feed, with 3.5 crop
acres and i.8 pasture acres required per horse and
half as much per colt.
The change to mechanical power thus reduced direct labor
requirements about 1,200 million man-hours: The labor
saved by. the introduction of the automobile and truck was
not estimated; if it is arbitrarily.set at ioo hours per vehicle,
another 500 million man-hours of agricultural labor was
saved.
It is difficult to convert agricultural man-hours into man-
years; much of the saving was no doubt reflected in shorter
working hours and less help from the farm family. Yet it
seems conservative to estimate that the farm labor force
would have been 5 or 10 percent larger in 1940 had these
shifts—which came within twenty years—not occurred.
The Whole and the Parts
Subject to the pervasive, limitations of information, one can
subdivide the indexes of output almost endlessly. For ex-
ample, we can follow Fabricant in classifying manufacturing
industries under imajor headings; then food, for example,
can be subdivided into 25 subclasses such as flour; and this
in turn into 7 products of flour mills. Nor need we stop
here: wheat flour—one of the 7 products—can obviously be
subdivided further.
l4Tractors, Trucks, and Automobiles (National Research Project, Report A-ge
Their results have been brought up to26 TRENDS IN OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT
As the products become more specific, we encounter
greater variety of trend and amplitude of fluctuation, as we
should expect. Shifts between kinds of flour will have little
impact on all flour, and shifts between breadstuffs and
vegetables will partly cancel, leaving the output of food
relatively unaffected. The tendency toward stability as the
industry coverage is extended is illustrated in Charts 2, 3, and
4, which portray trends of four kinds of flour, of the, food
industries that ranked among the first four in i 899 or 1939,
and of the broad industry categories that ranked among the
first four at either date.15
We are not surprised to find evidence of retardation in
the outputs of virtually all established industries making a
relatively narrow range of products. In Production Trends
in the United States since 1870 Art.hur F. Burns amply
demonstrated this retardation •to be a characteristic of a
progressive economy.'6 One may roughly generalize that we
do not wish to have the old products if we can have the new
ones. Nor is this ubiquitous decline in the rate of growth
of outputs of individual products or industries incompatible
with relative stability in the rate of growth of aggregate out-
put, as the negligible retardation of output in manufacturing,
mining, and agriculture before 1929 testifies.
It is a natural step to .test the hypothesis: can we say that
the greater the heterogeneity of the rates of growth in specific
industries, the greater is the rate of growth of the industry
group comprising them? There is strong evidence to suggest
that the answer is 'yes'.
A first test of the hypothesis can be made by comparing the
rates of growth (from 1899 to 1929) of the outputs of 36
l5Each of the rankings was confined to industries for which indexes of
output were available.
l6Ch. IV. Burns relied chiefly on annual series, and although his indexes do
not include as many products as the productivity studies, the period cov-
ered was longer and cydical influences on of trends could be
minimized.CHART t
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agricultural products with the rates of growth of 28 food
products in manufacturing.'7 The comparison is congruent
AGRICULTUREMANUFACTURING
Percentage increase in aggregate output 44 253
Number of products 36 28
Percentage increase in outputs of individual products:
First Quartile 17 54
Second Quartile 79 154
ThirdQuartile 215 6o8
Inter-Quartile ratio 2.51
with the hypothesis: both variability and the average rate of
increase were larger in manufacturing than in agriculture.
Burns' study of production trends for a longer period also
revealed greater variability in the growth of outputs in the
more rapidly growing industry sectors. Moreover, the same
correspondence of growth and variability occurred through
time: the trends of the outputs of individual products showed
greater divergences in periods when average growth was
more rapid.'8
Rapidity of the growth of total output is, it seems, asso-
ciated with wide dispersion of trends in individual industries.
This suggests a concrete sense in which one may speak of
the clash between security and progress: the rapid growth
of aggregate output implies the even more rapid growth of
new and the decline of old industries. It was as inevitable
that the rapid growth of the radio industry should virtually
destroy the player piano industry (the output of which fell
from 144,000 in 1925 to 1,690 in 1931)as that the rapid
growth of the automobile industry should virtually destroy
the carriage industry (the output of which fell from over
900,000 in 1899 to 3,600 in 1929). We should like to have
both a rapid increase in aggregate output and stability in
l7The agricultural products are those for which Barger gives outputs since
1899. In manufacturing the criteria for inclusion (a)data back to
1899,(b)a value of product of at leastmillion in 1899 or $20million
in 1929.
l8Op. cit., pp. 61-2, and 245.TRENDS IN OUTPUT 31
its composition—the former to keep pace with expanding
wants, and the latter to avoid the losses of specialized equip-
ment of entrepreneurs and crafts of employees and creating
'sick' industries in which resources are less mobile than
customers. It is highly probable that the goals are incon-
sistent.